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I.
There is no uniform corporate law within the Common Market. Each of
the six member States has its own system which, in almost all of the six
States, has either been revised recently (Germany, France) or is in the
process of being revised (Belgian, Italy, Holland). Apart from such nation-
ally inspired reforms, efforts have been made, at the initiative of the E.E.C.
institutions, to promote common rules between the six member States.
These efforts are to be situated on three different levels.
First, there are the efforts to coordinate the rules of the six national laws
insofar as needed to implement the right of establishment to which all
E.E.C. nationals are entitled in each of the member States. Such coordina-
tion tends, as set forth in art. 54, par. 3 (g) E.E.C. Treaty, to "render of
equal value the guarantees which member States require of companies
within the meaning of article 58, par. 2, so as to protect the interests both
of members and outsiders." On the basis of this article the E.E.C. Council
has enacted, on March 9, 1968, a directive-to be implemented by each of
the member States-coordinating some national legal provisions con-
cerning disclosure, validity of legal acts made by officers of the company
on behalf of the company, and grounds of nullity of companies (E.C.
Official Gazette of March 14, 1968, No. L 65/8).
Two other directives have been prepared by the E.E.C. Commission and
submitted to the Council for enactment, the first relating to the coordina-
tion of national legal provisions concerning the formation and the capital-
ization of national legal provisions concerning the formation and the capi-
talization of companies (E.C. Official Gazette of April 24, 1970, No. C
48/8); the second relating to the coordination of national legal provisions
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concerning (mainly intra-State) mergers (E.C. Official Gazette of July 14,
1970, No. C 89/20). All of these directives or proposed directives relate
only to specific company types (mostly the socit anonyme type); they do
not purport to unify national legal provisions but only tend to coordinate
them.
The second level on which efforts are made in the field of corporate law
concern some points which, according to article 220 of the E.E.C. Treaty,
are to be negotiated between the member States. They are a.o. "the mutual
recognition of firms or companies .... the maintenance of their legal per-
sonality, if their registered office is transferred from one country to an-
other, and the possibility of mergers between firms or companies which are
subject to different domestic laws." Until now visible progress has only
been achieved in respect of the first point mentioned, by the signing on
February 29, 1968 of a Treaty on the mutual recognition of companies and
bodies corporate. This result was the easiest to achieve since recognition of
foreign companies was in most member States, if not in all, already secured
by virtue of existing legal provisions or practices. In respect of the other
points, e.g. inter-State mergers, only extensive preparatory work has been
done. In connection with the latter subject, reference should be made,
though, to two proposed E.E.C. directives concerning the taxation of
inter-State mergers and stockholdings (E.C. Official Gazette of March 22,
1969, No. C 33).
Efforts are finally made on a third level which is the level of the Societas
Europaea (S.E.). Instead of coordinating existing national law provisions
(art. 54, par. 3 (g) referred to above), or instead of negotiating an in-
ternational Treaty between the member States to set out some rules on
conflicts of law (art. 220 referred to above), efforts on this level aim to
introduce a uniform company type which will be available, under certain
conditions, in each of the member States in addition to the existing com-
pany types. After considerable preparatory work, the Commission has
approved and submitted to the Council on June 30, 1970 a lengthy (284
articles) proposed regulation to be taken on the basis of article 235 E.E.C.
Treaty, concerning the introduction of a European company-type (E.C.
Official Gazette of October 10, 1970, No. C 124).
The purpose of this report is not to discuss the reforms which are carried
on in each of the six member States, such reforms being too different from
one country to the other, nor to discuss the above-mentioned efforts to
achieve a certain degree of harmonization between the laws of the member
States, such efforts still being too much in the stage of preparation. Instead,
we would like to discuss briefly a few trends which seem to be common,
each more than the other, to the six national laws and most of which are
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 3
496 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
reflected in the documents prepared by the E.E.C. institutions, mainly in
the E.E.C. proposed regulation for a European company (Societas Eu-
ropaea) type (hereinafter referred to as "S.E."). In discussing these trends
we shall consider almost exclusively the larger corporation type.
It.
The alienation of shareholders from the life of the company is a
well-known phenomenon in larger corporations on which there is no need
to insist. This phenomenon raises the question of shareholders' protection.
In a discussion of modern German corporate law, Professor Vagts ("Re-
forming the 'modern' corporation. Perspectives from the German," 80
Harvard Law Review, 1966-7, p. 23 ff., on p. 59 and ff.) points out that the
U.S. shareholder has a number of safeguards which his German (or for that
matter his European continental) counterpart does not enjoy. These
safeguards are: the pervasive protection in the J.S. of the SEC; the
protection given in the U.S. by a vigorous accounting profession; the
stringency of disclosure provisions; the far more frightening effect of share-
holders' actions kept alive by, among other factors, contingent fee arrange-
ments-a practice not recognized on the Continent.
Although recent changes, or proposed changes, in the national laws of
most of the E.E.C. countries aim to draw benefit from the American
example to strengthen the shareholder's protection, e.g. in respect of dis-
closure requirements or proxy regulations (see e.g. for Germany: Steefel
and von Falkenhausen, "The new German stock corporation law," 52
Cornell Law Quarterly, 1966-7, 518 ff., particularly on p. 542 ff.), it is
unlikely that these changes will achieve much in associating the share-
holders more closely with the life of the company. The main reasons
therefor may be on the one hand the widespread use of bearer shares,
which makes communications with, from or between shareholders more
burdensome, and on the other hand, it would seem at least for the time
being, the greater extent of indifference and passivity on the part of Euro-
pean investors towards stockholdings. The absence of efficient shareholder
protection in the larger company type may have caused, as it is suggested
by Professor Vagts, the institution of an intermediary body, the superviso-
ry board, whose task is to control management on behalf of the share-
holders.
Following the German example-which has inspired both the new
French company law of 1967 and the proposed Belgian and Dutch corpo-
rate laws-the E.E.C. proposal for an S.E. provides three different policy
making bodies in the company: management composed of one or more
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members designated by the supervisory board (art. 63); the supervisory
board composed of three, or a multpile of three, members of which two
thirds are elected by the shareholders and one third by the employees (see
below) (art. 74); and the shareholders' meeting. Management has all pow-
ers which are not explicitly granted to the other organs of the company; it
represents the company vis-b-vis third parties subject, however, to prior
approval by the supervisory board in respect of certain important legal
acts, namely those concerning the closing or transfer of the enterprise or
important parts thereof, important reductions or extensions of the corpo-
rate activity, important changes in the organization of the enterprise and
the beginning or ending of a permanent cooperation with another enterprise
(art. 66), and subject also to prior consultation of the work council (see
below).
The charter of the company can make further acts dependent upon the
approval of the supervisory board. All these limitations, however, cannot
be invoked against third persons (art. 66). The shareholders' meeting, on
the other hand, has certain powers which are limitatively enumerated in
art. 83: they concern the increase or reduction of capital; the issue of
convertible bonds; the designation or revocation of members of the super-
visory board; the institution of shareholders' actions; the appointment of
statutory auditors; the allocation of profits; the power to amend the char-
ter, to dissolve or to transform the company, to merge, to associate or to
alienate the company with, or to, another company (art. 83). Between these
two organic acts the supervisory board which has for assignment to control
management permanently without participating in management or repre-
senting the company, except in those cases which are explicitly enumer-
ated in the proposed regulation.
Apart from designating the managers of the company (and revoking such
appointments for serious cause) and approving certain important decisions,
as indicated above, the supervisory board is entitled to be informed quar-
terly, or whenever it requests, concerning the management of the company.
It may give its opinion concerning all matters of importance to the com-
pany (art. 73). It may institute, at its own initiative or at the request of the
shareholders' meeting, court proceedings for damages against one or more
managers of the company (art. 72). Last but not least it may, in agreement
with management, establish the annual financial statements, and decide to
reserve half of the annual profits (art. 213 and 217). Only if no agreement is
reached between management and the supervisory board, it pertains to the
shareholders' meeting to establish the financial statements and to allocate
(reserve or distribute) all of the profits.
It may appear from the last point, and from the fact that the supervisory
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board has the power to designate the managers of the company, that there
is a tendency, in the proposal for an S.E. libi in the new or proposed
corporate laws of most of the member States, to transfer certain powers
which traditionally were considered to be shareholders' privileges to the
supervisory board. On the other hand, however, the individual share-
holders' powers are strengthened in this proposal for S.E., by granting a
derivative suit to a shareholder or shareholders possessing 5% of the
outstanding shares or, alternatively, shares for an amount of 100,000 dol-
lars (art. 72), and by authorizing a shareholder or shareholders possessing
10% of the outstanding shares or shares for an amount of 200,000 dollars
(as well as the representative of a group of bondholders and the work
council), to request the court to designate a special auditor in case of
serious misgivings concerning the ability or the performance of the man-
agers or members of the supervisory board (art. 97).
III.
The alienation of shareholders referred to in the preceding section is
counterbalanced to a certain extent by the tendency to integrate employees
in the corporate structure. The proposed regulation for an S.E. contains a
chapter on the representation of employees in the S.E. Such representation
will occur through the organization in each S.E. having a permanent estab-
lishment in more than one member State, of a European Work Council
(art. 100). Such council will function in addition to the work councils which
in accordance with national provisions may have been instituted in any one
of the permanent establishments (art. 101). Members of the European work
council are elected by the employees of the separate permanent estab-
lishment in accordance with the rules in effect in the member State where
the permanent establishment is located, for the local work councils (art.
103 and 104).
The work council will meet with management at regular intervals and
will be informed by management through quarterly reports about the gener-
al economic situation of the company (art. 120). It is entitled to receive the
same information as the shareholders, among which are the annual financial
statements (art. 121). In respect of a whole series of problems being of
immediate concern for the employees, such as general working conditions
and safety regulations, management cannot take a valid decision without
prior approval from the work council (art. 123). For other points the
council must be heard (art. 124), or have been consulted in writing (art.
125); the latter applies in respect of the decisions enumerated in the
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preceding section for which the management needs the prior approval of
the supervisory board. The powers thus conferred upon the work council
are, however, limited to matters for which no collective bargaining agree-
ments have been concluded (art. 119). Conflicts between the work council
and management will be arbitrated by a special arbitration commission
composed on a 50/50 basis, and presided over by a mutually agreed on, or
court appointed, chairman (art. 128).
The institution of a work council materializing co-determination mainly
in social (i.e. non economic) matters, is in accordance with the law of the
six member States, be it that the rules as to the size of enterprises for
which a work council must be instituted, the composition and particularly,
the powers of the work council differ considerably from one State to the
other (for a description of the law of some European States see The
Company, law structure and reform in eleven countries, edited by C. de
Houghton, Pep, London, 1970, p. 199 ff.). In addition, however, to the
institution of a work council, the proposed regulation for an S.E. also
provides for a one-third representation of employees in the company's
supervisory board (art. 137), the other two-thirds of the board being elect-
ed by the stockholders (art. 74).
The charter may even provide for a larger representation, whereas on
the other hand no representation of employees will be provided for if at
least two-thirds of the employees of the S.E. so elect (art. 138). The
proposal for an S.E. in respect of representation of the employees on the
supervisory board of the company, is substantially in line with the general
German co-determination law applicable to certain company types, but
falls short of the specific German provisions for the Coal and Steel sector,
where shareholders and employees are equally represented in the super-
visory board, and where employees have moreover a representative on the
managing board of the company. It also differs considerably from a
recently proposed Dutch law on co-determination for larger companies,
which provides that the members of the supervisory board will be desig-
nated by co-optation subject, however, to a right of objection vested in
both the shareholders' meeting and the work council. In view of such
co-optation the supervisory board may act upon suggestions made by the
shareholders' meeting, the work council and even management.
Co-determination in economic matters through representation of the
employees in the supervisory board of the company, or even in the manag-
ing board, is, as one knows, a very controverted subject both in manage-
ment and trade union quarters. The idea of co-determination is opposed by
managers who are afraid of sharing power with trade union representatives
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in matters which are of no direct concern to the employees, and by trade
union representatives who are afraid that participation of the employees in
management may make employees more understanding and therefore less
vindictive than when the bargaining is carried out from the outside by trade
union representatives. Also, it is difficult to discuss the effects of co-
determination on economic issues.
Professor Vagts who has examined this point (among others) in con-
nection with the German experience (art. cit., on p. 69-72) tends to think
that co-determination may in certain sectors (like coal and steel) have
somewhat spurred the rise of wages-which however, may have been
compensated for by a smaller amount of man-hours lost -through
strikes-may have caused more fringe benefits for the employees, the labor
representatives "trading their assent to new investments for welfare ex-
penditures," has almost certainly procured increased stability and conti-
nuity in employment, seems not to have had a restrictive effect on new
investments, the labor representatives "being quite willing in general to
expend money on facilities so long as the alternative is a payment of
dividends." On the other hand, co-determination seems not to work against
price increase "particularly when this is associated with a wage or fringe
benefit increase."
Integration of employees in the corporate structure on the one hand, and
alienation of shareholders on the other, seem to have found an equilibrium,
within the corporate structure, in the supervisory board-as is best shown,
it seems, by the above-mentioned new Dutch proposal, according to which
members of the supervisory board are designated by co-optation-pro-
vided, however, as expressed by a veto right, that they are acceptable both
to the shareholders' meeting and to the work council. Through this super-
visory board both shareholders and employees are called to control the
ever-strengthening power of professional management. Many Europeans
are fond of viewing this solution as a hyphen between Marxist socialism
and American capitalism.
Co-determination, and the integration of labourers in capitalistic struc-
tures for which it stands, may be seen in a broader perspective. In a report
prepared in 1966 by Mr. Zijlstra on behalf of the E.E.C. Commission,
concerning economic policy and competition in the E.E.C., and the mem-
ber States, six types of economic planning are distinguished, the mildest
form of planning being the preparing and publishing by a government
agency of mere prognoses concerning future economic developments, the
most extreme one being the type of planning which is characteristic for
socialist countries, i.e. detailed and for all enterprises binding planification
elaborated by a central government agency.
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The last but one most extreme type is a planning one which is now in
effect in at least two E.E.C. countries, France and Belgium. According to
this type of planning, general goals of economic policy are laid down by the
authorities, which goals are then pursued not only by indirect means, such
as influencing the flow of national income, money and production, but also
by specific incentives which are only available for private enterprises
which, in consideration for the incentives obtained, agree to comply with
the general and specific objectives of the general plan. Such plan is also
binding upon governmental agencies and public enterprises engaged in
economic activities. In both countries the general (five year) plan is elabo-
rated by a planning authority in accordance with a two-stage procedure:
during the first stage the fundamental options are proposed and approved,
during the second stage the objectives are further elaborated; in both stages
Parliamentary approval is required but only after extensive consultation,
on a regional and a national level, with all kinds of professional groups,
amongst which enterpreneurial and trade union groups, and economic
institutions in which both groups are represented.
The collaboration of trade unions in the elaboration of the plan is
another sign of integration of labourers-not only, as is shown by the
co-determination laws discussed above, on the level of the enterprise, but
also on a nationa! level-in the economic decision-making process. (It may
be interesting to note that in countries like Germany and Holland where
co-determination on the enterprise level is most advanced, economic plan-
ning is of a milder type than in France and Belgium where co-deter-
mination on the enterprise level seems to be less in demand).
IV.
In the first section of this report reference was made to the efforts of the
E.E.C. authorities to coordinate the national legislation of the member
States, in respect of intra-State mergers-as well as to propose in-
ternational rules between the member States to facilitate inter-State merg-
ers. These efforts purport to provide legal rules to effect concentration
between enterprises by merging separate legal entities into one and the
same legal entity. The same effect can be achieved of course through the
acquisition by one enterprise (which will be called hereinafter the dominat-
ing enterprise) of all or virtually all of the capital shares of one or more
enterprises which will thus remain subsidiary companies having a separate
legal entity. If the dominating company does not acquire all the shares of
the subsidiary and a minority of the shares are held by shareholders not
pertaining to the group of the dominating company, a special problem
arises as shown in a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Paris dated
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May 22, 1965 (Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy, Recuei Dalloz, 1968, Jur.,
147 if.)
In this case the American majority shareholder, Fruehauf International,
had instructed the management of its French subsidiary company not to
perform under a contract made by the French subsidiary for the sale of
material to be exported to communist China, on the ground that such
delivery appeared to be in conflict with U.S. regulations. Following these
instructions, the members on the Board representing the French minority
shareholders, tendered their resignations and requested the designation of
an administrator to perform the contract in the interest of the French
subsidiary company. The commercial court of Corbeil granted the request,
considering that the non-performance of the contract would result in severe
damages for the French subsidiary which might endanger the very exis-
tence of the company and, consequently, the employment of more than 600
company employees. On appeal, the Paris court substantially confirmed the
judgment, holding that preference should be given to the interest of the
French company over the interest of the majority shareholder.
The special problem illustrated by the Fruehauf decision concerns the
conflict between economic reality, which is that a company is subordinated
to the interests of a larger group of which it is'part, and legal structure,
which is that the subsidiary company has its own legal entity supposedly
giving form to a separate corporate interest. Such separate corporate in-
terest is of the utmost importance not only for minority shareholders who
will not be compensated for harmful consequences, affecting the subsidiary
company, of decisions dictated by the majority shareholders in function,
and to the advantage of the overall interest of the group, but also for
creditors of the subsidiary company who can only enforce their claim on
the assets of the subsidiary.
This conflict has led to special legislation in Germany referred to as
Konzernrecht (whereas in other member States the desirability of such
legislation is still controverted), which has served as an example for chap-
ter VII of the proposed S.E. regulation (art. 223 ff.). After having defined
the concept of Konzern and Konzern enterprises-two conditions, even-
tually to be interpreted by the E.C. Court of Justice in Luxemburg, must be
fulfilled: a lien of subordination of one or more enterprises vis-a-vis the
dominating enterprise and a common leadership-the proposed regulation
for an S.E. provides special guarantees for so-called "free" shareholders of
the subsidiaries (i.e., shareholders not pertaining to the Konzern) on the
one hand and for creditors of the subsidiaries on the other hand.
As to the free shareholders, the proposal grants them the right to quit the
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subsidiary company either by selling shares to the dominating company for
a fair price (art. 229) or, at their option, by exchanging their shares for
shares of the dominating company (art. 230), and contains provisions
outlining the procedure to determine the price and the exchange rate (art.
232-237). The dominating enterprise may choose, however, to convince
the free shareholders not to quit by promising to pay them a yearly
compensation in proportion to the face value of their shares (art. 23 i). As
to the creditors of the subsidiary companies, the proposed regulation de-
clares the dominating company jointly and severally liable for the liabilities
of its subsidiary companies provided, however, that the creditor has first
tried to enforce its claim against the subsidiary (art. 239).
The proposed regulation further contains disclosure requirements in that
a Konzern enterprise must make its affiliation with the Konzern public (art.
226), and must also publish a consolidated balance sheet (art. 237). As a
consideration for these various guarantees, but particularly for those grant-
ed to the "free" shareholders, the proposed regulation provides explicitly
that the management of a subordinated company may not refuse to comply
with the instructions given by the dominating enterprise, on the ground that
the instructions are incompatible with the interests of the subsidiary (art.
250).
As said above, to-date specific Konzern law is only in effect in Germany.
The question whether it should be introduced is being debated in the other
member States, particularly in the Netherlands. The fact that it has been
included in the E.E.C. proposal for an S.E. seems to indicate, however,
that the idea of specific Konzern rules gains ground. It is hard to know why
Konzern law seems to have special appeal on the European continent
whereas it seems to have no counterpart in Anglo-American law. As
possible reasons can be cited: the concentration of enterprises which is
very much needed in the common market and which, because of the
intricacy of legal provisions concerning mergers between companies, can
only be easily achieved through the acquisition of shares; the lesser degree
of protection, as compared with the U.S. and England, to minority share-
holders by general corporate or other rules.
It should be emphasized at the end of these brief remarks, that the
existence of a specific Konzern law does of course not prejudice the
application of national or E.E.C. anti-trust law. Still, it may be recalled that
the E.E.C. Commission, in its 1966 memorandum on concentration of
enterprises within the Common Market, has taken a rather favorable look
at concentration by giving voice to its opinion that article 85 of the E.E.C.
will apply only exceptionally to concentration agreements, and that con-
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centration must be viewed instead from the angle of article 86, i.e. abuse of
dominant position.
V.
Two or more corporations may wish to cooperate without losing their
corporate entities through a merger, or without losing their autonomies by
being purchased by a dominating company. Such cooperation may be
achieved either by setting up a joint venture between the cooperating
companies, or by entering into an association agreement. In France these
two forms have not been considered to suit all purposes, the first device
(joint venture) allegedly being too rigid, the second one (association) which
would have no separate legal entity, being too loose. Accordingly, the
French government has instituted by presidential Decree of September 23,
1967 a new body corporate called the groupement d'inter~t 6conomique
(G .I.E.) (see: Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 1967 Legislation, p. 36 1).
The G.I.E. is conceived as a very flexible body corporate which may be
used by big or small companies, but also by physical persons to give legal
personality to a common activity for a certain period of time. The G.I.E.
must have an economic purpose which, however, must not necessarily be
to generate profits. It may, or may not, have a capital. The articles of
association may freely determine the organization of the company in re-
spect of, among other things, voting power, quorum and/or voting majority,
management, control, dissolution and winding up of the company. In spite
of this flexibility the G.I.E. enjoys legal personality as of its matriculation
in the Registry of Commerce. Unless otherwise agreed with a contracting
party, the members of the G.I.E. are held to be jointly and severally liable
for the obligations of the company, which is normal, considering the fact
that the G.I.E. can be formed without capital. The G.I.E. may issue bonds,
if it is formed by companies which are all entitled to do so themselves.
Taxwise, the G.I.E. is entirely transparent, i.e., profits are taxed as part of
the income of its members.
It should be added that the Italian Civil Code of 1942 did already
contain similar provisions (art. 2602 ff.), and that the G.I.E. is considered
by those who believe that the E.E.C. proposal for an S.E. is too com-
plicated, as a valid alternative for the S.E.
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